Defending images in Pecock's Repressor: caritas, the absent friend and the sense of touch Thow shalt loue the Lord thi God of al thin herte, and of al thi soule, and of alle thi strengthis.
thus follows Thomas Aquinas who influentially expounds charity in the Summa theologiae, in a thoroughly Aristotelianised understanding, as 'a friendship of man and God'.
11
The requirements of caritas thus to some extent underpin Pecock's entire literary project, and its expression as friendship is central to works like the Donet, the Folewer and the Reule.
12
While the paradigm of friendship for caritas is left largely implicit in the Repressor, it surfaces compellingly in his defence of images. Pecock's long discussion of images in the Repressor culminates in the idea of Christ as an absent friend, an image of whom offers the Christian a form of presence essential to meeting the difficult demands of charity. 13 Pecock sets out the argument thus:
11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, gen. ed. Thomas Gilby, 60 vols. . 12 As Pecock explains in the Donet, Christ's 'two tables' are three-fold, defining an ethics of love towards God, self and neighbour. Fulfilment of the command in these three areas means the 'remenaunt' of God's law will also be fulfilled, p. 17 (cf. Reule, e.g. p. 240). It is this three-fold application of Christ's commandments that governs Pecock's categorisation of the whole of God's law into three tables understood to encapsulate all 'eendal' moral virtues. A fourth table (placed first) contains the 'meenal' virtues. These 'meenal' virtues accord with the seven matters that the Repressor and the Reule set out as the means to fulfilling the commandment to love wholeheartedly; these seven matters, in turn, can be reduced to Christ's two tables and are comprehended fully in Pecock's four tables. These four tables are intended to encapsulate and ultimately replace the existing multiple tabulations relating to God's law, such as the Decalogue, the cardinal virtues, the seven deadly sins, and so on. The Donet lays out the four tables; the Folewer, intended as an extension of the Donet, gives an extended justification of the four tables in Part 2. Both the seven matters and the four tables will teach that God is worthy to be loved with the love of friendship above all others, and instruct how to love God, self and neighbour with the pure love of friendship. See profitable to ech man for to ymagine this freend be present to us bodili and in a maner visibili. And sithen herto serueth ful weel and ful myche the ymage of Crist crucified.
14 The need for love ('gode affecciouns') for Christ the friend is potentially compromised by the absence of presence, that is, by the absence of sensibles: 'this freend зeueth not to us his presence visibili'. An imagined image, supported by a physical 'ymage of Crist crucified', however, can serve to mediate friendship with Christ. The underlying logic here follows that of the 'general profis' of Part 1, which establish images as one of the 'meenes' or instruments through which a man is able to recollect the knowledge required to obey the commandment to 'loue thi Lord God of al thin herte'. As I suggest in this essay, Pecock's use of the figure of
Christ as friend in his defence of images is the logical extension of an Aristotelianised understanding, worked out across his corpus, of the command to love God. But so too is it rooted in an Aristotelianised theory of the operation of the imagination and of sensory perception, and of their key roles in mitigating absence and mediating presence. Together, Aristotelian theories of friendship and of sensory perception provide Pecock with his most affectively charged arguments as to why Christians need images.
Pecock's broader defence of images is thus framed with a particular set of concerns: the human desire for presence and the problem of absence; the role played by imagination and memory in making that which is absent present; and, finally, imagination's and memory's a priori reliance on sensory perception. Orthodox defenders of images justify the use of physical images in part on the grounds that they act as a stabilizer for the sense of sight, and so also for the imaginative and memory practices at the heart of late-medieval piety. 15 As Shannon Gayk has described, Pecock similarly advocates images as props for vision and visual images drawn in the imagination. 16 Pecock's engagement with Aristotelian friendship, however, with its emphasis on presence and proximity, also facilitates his advocacy of the value of the physical image's appeal to the sense of touch. If a reader accepts his reasoning as to why an image enables a man to love Christ in His absence, Pecock says in concluding his defence of image use, then he or she also has 'sufficient ground forto excuse fro blame' those who 'touche with her hondis the feet and othere parties and the clothis of ymagis, and wolen thanne aftir sette to her visage and to her iзen and to her mouthis her tho hondis'. 17 The utility of the image -and specifically the threedimensional image, with 'parties' and 'clothis' -is not therefore just in the visual image it affords to the sense of sight, but also in the tangible experience it mediates to the sense of touch: the same logic that allows a Christian to use an image as a proxy to see Christ in His absence, allows that he or she use it likewise to touch Him. Pecock's intervention in the controversy over images thus moves beyond the traditional terms of the written word versus the visual image, or of images as libri laicorum, to the relationship of material images to mental ones, and thereby out to a broader consideration of the structures of human cognition and sensation. 18 By thinking about the problem of images through the figure of the friend, Pecock makes a powerful claim: in substituting for that which is absent, the image mimetically offers presence in ways that structures an ethics central to caritas, not just of vision, but also of touch. Another source of anxiety was the imputation of miraculous powers to images themselves. From a Lollard perspective, the proclivity displayed by some for touching images is evidence of both belief in their inherent power (which might be conveyed through touch) and of idolatry. One early fifteenth-century Lollard text thus registers unease at the spectacle of Christians clinging to images, caressing and kissing them, as if they were really those they represent: some 'lewid folc…cleuen sadly strokande and kyssand þese olde stones and stokkis, laying doun hore grete 19 Repressor, pp. 34 Species are thus generated by the object but received in the perceiver in the act of perception. Just as a person is able to see a stone due to the presence of 'the species of the stone in his eye', so a person is able to love another through perceiving and cognizing their species. 35 It is this, as Thomas goes on to explain, that effects a kind of mutual indwelling or union of the lover and the beloved ('Cognitively, the person loved, Y, is said to dwell in the lover, X, in the sense that he is consistently present in X's thoughts'). 36 Love, then, cannot arise without presence and perception, but its intensity derives instead from the person who loves (just as clear vision of a stone depends, not on the stone's species, but in 'the eye's visual power'). This, then, accounts for the importance of proximity in the determining the strength of love felt for another. In the Repressor, Pecock takes this Thomist logic further: the nearer one is to the friend the more love is aroused; the closest one can be to another is to be touching.
Engaged as the Repressor is with the precise terms of Lollard arguments, the kinds of images Pecock requires his reader to view through the lens of friendship are, of course, predominantly (though not exclusively) three-dimensional ones. As Margaret Aston notes:
33 Summa theologiae, 2a2ae.26, 7 (Gilby, XXXIV, 138-9). 34 Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 13. Pp. 11-17 provides an excellent introduction to cognition and the role of species in Thomist thought. 35 The useful comparison with Aquinas's explanation of how species operate in sight (1a.89, 6) is noted by the translator (Gilby, XXXIV, 138). 36 Summa theologiae, 1a2ae.28, 2 (Gilby, XIX, 92-3).
The imagery seen as proscribed by the law was primarily three dimensional: the works of carvers in wood and stone…Lollards were certainly critical of the work of contemporary painters, but in directing the main burden of their criticism at image-worship they had in mind sculpture -"the craft of graving" -more than painting.
37
While this concern partly stems from Old Testament prohibitions concerning graven images, it also lies in the three-dimensional image's different claim to realness in comparison with a flat, two-dimensional one. 38 If for Lollards this sculptural quality, in approximating greater lifelikeness, might lead the viewer down the dangerous path of crediting the image with liveliness, for Pecock (though he acknowledges that images may indeed at times miraculously seem alive) an image's lifelikeness works less to animate the image than the imagination by providing tools for sensory perception. 39 Such sculptural images, niched in the fabric of churches and used in liturgical performances, offer visible presence to the sense of sight, but they also can be reached out to and touched. The paradigm established by these three rules thus has staggering implications for Pecock's theory of images: not merely 'rememoratijf or mynding signes', images are mediators of the perception of presence at the heart of friendship; and just as the desire to be in the presence of a friend is completed in an embrace or a kiss, so too is the imaginative work of making an absent friend present completed in touching an image. In revising the function of 44 While the Ethics has little to say on the subject of images, it provides particularly powerful avenues for thinking about the binaries of presence and absence in terms of the interplay of sensory perception and affection.
Aristotle establishes that friendship is not only 'necessary' ('without friends no one would choose to live') but also 'noble'. 45 While the paradigm of friendship structures relationships from the domestic (parent-child; man-wife) to the political (ruler-subject; nation-nation), perfect friendship is that between equals. Aristotle defines perfect friendship as: 'the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves.' 46 The conditions for perfect friendship are therefore grounded in virtue, equality and likeness -the friend is 'another self' -as well as in reciprocity of feeling and mutual well-wishing, to the extent that one friend is prepared to sacrifice himself for the other ('the good man…does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them'). 47 For such a friendship between equals to arise, however, both time and familiarity are required: 'one must…acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with self-consciousness and ultimately of happiness: a man 'needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend…and this will be realized in their living together'. 50 The perception of the presence of the friend is thus necessary, not only in order for friendly feelings to arise but also for those feelings to be sustained:
Those who live together delight in each other and confer benefits on each other, but those who are asleep or locally separated are not performing, but are disposed to perform, the activities of friendship; distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind'.
51
Somewhat problematically for the medieval reception of the Ethics, however, the human possibility that friendship might survive (temporary) absence or distance is not one Aristotle affords to God, nor does he allow perfect friendship to exist between God and man on the grounds of inequality:
Much can be taken away and friendship remain, but when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases.
52
As Jacques Derrida observes on this passage in Derrida's reading of the Ethics usefully articulates the condition of presence for the 'energy' -activity, but also force or potency -constitutive of Aristotelian friendship. If friendship is generated and nurtured through living together and through sensory perception, how can man (in the here and now) be friends with God? While medieval thinking asserts instead that friendship with God is necessary and possible, Aristotelian friendship, in making proximity or presence the condition of friendship, poses the question of how love for God is to be maintained and acted out at a distance and in His absence. 54 Christ's incarnation is key to medieval answers to this problem, but so too, as the Repressor demonstrates, are images.
Images and absence
While Aristotelian qualities of perfect friendship -the friend is 'another self', prepared to sacrifice his life for his friends -might be particularly suggestive for analogy with Christ, as they are elsewhere in scholastic and vernacular theology, Thomas Aquinas's theology of friendship, as when a man has loved something fervently, he desires its presence; and therefore, since we rightly owe the saints of God to be worshipped and venerated by means of the honours that are due to them, because we cannot have the persons themselves present,
we are advised at least to come near to their relics and images in order to worship them.
60
Images and relics, in the form of body parts or objects that have been touched by or worn on the body, offer material points of connection with an absent God and absent saints, love for whom manifests itself as a desire for presence, for nearness to them. At heart, then, image-making addresses the human need for something of the divine to be made available to the senses. As
David Freedberg remarks, the aim of '[medieval meditative] forms that depend on real images for the production of mental ones' is precisely 'to grasp that which is absent'. 61 What Dymmok imagines as presence, however -being near to a material relic or image -though not without active potential (as a locus for worship, but also for healing, for spiritual transformation, etc.), is a far cry from that defined by Aristotle and implied by Pecock, as the energy of living together. Forwhi the likenes of a signe to his significat, (that is to seie, to the thing signified bi him,) wole helpe the signe forto signifie and forto make remembraunce the bettir upon the thing signified; but so it is, that ymagis graued, coruun, or зut ben more lijk to Crist and to his passioun, than ben the sacramentis whiche Crist ordeyned. at the start of each of these works the operation of the five outer wits (sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch) and their cerebral processing by the five inner wits (common wit, imagination, fantasy, estimation and memory). 66 The Donet explains that the office of the senses is 'forto knowe bodili þingis in her presence, and whilis þei ben in kynde'; the inward wits, instead, work to know such things when they are absent. 67 
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Precisely what these 'similitudis', 'likenessis' or 'ymagis' are is made clearer in the Folewer, which builds on the foundation of sensory knowledge given in the Donet by detailing more fully the optical theory of intromission. 69 This theory is an extension of medieval thinking around the notion of species, at the heart (as we have seen) of Thomist understandings of cognition. The 'likeness' (also referred to in optical theory as 'species') of an object is impressed into the eyeball, from whence the 'spiritis' -a bodily spirit that performs the offices of soul -carries it into the sinews (or nerves): the eye thus 'seeþ and knowiþ þe þing whos liknesse is so receyuyd into þe iзe'. 70 That likeness is then conveyed further 'bi office of spiritis' into the forehead, where it is impressed first lightly in the common wit and then more deeply in the imagination, by which likeness the inner wits 'knowe þe same þing' as the eye perceived. The way in which a likeness of an object sensed is brought into the body by means of spiritis and impressed in the imagination supports the logic of Pecock's claim that the more like an image is to the thing it signifies the easier it is to do cognitive work with it; it also discloses a material aspect to imaginative 'making present'. Likenesses -whether first brought into the mind through the eye or through any other organ of sense -are called up from the store in memory to stock the images required in the process of imagining. 71 The cerebral struggle involved in calling into mind 'withinneforth', without an external image 'withouteforth' looked upon by the eye, is amply reflected in Pecock's convoluted syntax. But the essential point is a simple one: images, especially those that are like that which they signify, make the devotional work of memory easier and less painful, but also less error-prone -a man's wit shall be 'dressid [guided, directed] and lad forthe euener and more stabili' -by making present to the sense of sight an image upon which inner sight can found its images in the imagination.
What motivates Pecock's thinking here, and throughout his discussion of the senses, imagination and memory, is a recognition of man's natural frailty. It is because 'mankinde in this lijf is so freel' that 'seable' signs are needed in addition to 'heareable' ones: man's ability to recall and remember rightly is affected by labour, study, old age and sickness (when 'his heed is feeble for labour or studie bifore had or for sikenes or for age'); and humans are prone to forgetfulness. 73 The sixth opening conclusion on pilgrimages offered by Pecock in Part 2 of the God, that he mai therbi be hertid and strengthid in wil forto serue God'; he therefore needs to 'ofte thinke vpon tho thingis and meenis, whiche schulden stire him forto loue God and drede God'. And yet: 'forto so ofte remembre we ben ful freel and forзeteful'. 75 The memory work central to obeying the biblical commandment to love God, neighbour and self is potentially compromised by man's natural frailty. As Thomas acknowledges in his discussion of charity in the Summa, although God is of Himself 'supremely knowable, …on account of the feebleness of our knowledge, which has to depend on things of sense, we do not find him so'. 76 For Pecock, as we have seen, images are part of the solution to man's dependency on sense perception.
Significantly, then, it is in the context of this reminder of the command to 'loue and drede God', that Pecock first invokes the figure of the absent friend (though he does not use the term 'friend', the analogy is implicitly one of friendship). Referring to the authority of reason ('doom of resoun allowith'), Pecock argues it is permissible:
forto make and haue for us silf and for othere men ymagis of men and wommen, that tho men and wommen be therbi the oftir thouзt upon, and therfore be therbi the more loued and the better serued, and that the more be doon and suffrid of us and of othere biholders, for as miche as we bithenken tho persoones or the ensaumpling of the persoones so representid bi the ymagis, and that the more be doon and suffrid for her sake of us silf and of othere men seing the same ymagis with vs. Ech man hath nede forto haue gode affecciouns anentis Crist, as upon his best freend;
and this freend зeueth not to us his presence visibili; wherfore it is profitable to ech man for to ymagine this freend be present to us bodili and in a maner visibili. And sithen herto serueth ful weel and ful myche the ymage of Crist crucified, whilis and if the biholder ymagineth Crist to be streiзt abrode bodili thoruз the bodi of the same ymage, heed to heed, hond to hond, breste to breste, foot to foot.
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In our second look at this passage, we should first note the invocation of the commandment of caritas ('ech man hath nede forto haue gode affecciouns anentis Crist'), its expression as friendship ('as upon his best freend') and the way it steers Pecock's argument: images are imbricated profoundly in fulfilling the fundamental requirements of Christian living. Christ the friend is not visibly present, and yet as the first rule has established and as Aristotle emphasises, presence is the condition for the arousal of love and its increase. This, as Thomas emphasises in his account of charity in the Summa, is rooted in 'dwelling together', which concept (as the translator notes) 'is given its full and active force…Convivere, conversatio, communicatio, participatio are key-words for association which is the basis of friendship'. 81 The condition of cohabitation for friendship is likewise drawn out by Pecock in the proofs he gives of the first rule:
This reule is openli trewe bi experience. Forwhi, (not withstonding a man talke and speke of his freend at the mete table or in sum other place, and haue as good affeccioun as he can haue upon the same freend in such absence,) зit if in the meene while the freend come into him personali and sitte doun with him, he schal haue miche gretter affeccioun vpon the seid freend than he hadde in the freendis absence.
82
The 'mete [dinner] table' becomes a kind of paradigmatic space for practising friendship: for sitting and talking together in person, or, in the friend's absence, for sitting and talking about the friend. The problem is thus implicitly raised: how is Christ to be loved above all others, if those others are present and He is absent? 83 Imagining Christ to be 'present to us bodili' goes some way to countering this problem, not least since, as the second rule has established, making something present in the imagination, though inferior to bodily presence, is nonetheless a real form of presence with a material felt aspect that enables love. This imaginative memory work is aided best by using an image of Christ crucified, because, as established by the third rule, it bears a direct likeness with that which it represents.
It is this insistence on the importance of the sign's likeness to what it signifies that leads Pecock to reject, earlier in the Repressor, the Lollard argument '"that ech Cristen man is a perfiter and a fuller and a spedier [that is, 'efficacious', but also 'exact'] ymage of Crist than is eny stok [piece of wood] or stoon graued"'. 84 In so doing, Pecock closes down the possibility (at the heart of Lollard arguments against images) that the energy required for friendship with Christ might derive from proximity to one's neighbour. Listing three conditions required in order to be a perfect, full and efficacious image of Christ, Pecock reiterates firstly that the greater degree of 82 Repressor, p. 267. 83 Thomas in the Summa theologiae asserts that since charity is caused by God it cannot, in this sense, cease or be diminished (see 2a2ae.24, 10,), but he acknowledges that man's reliance on sense perception to know God creates a problem (see 2a2ae,27, 4). 84 Repressor, p. 219. See further on man as a true image of God, Aston, Lollards and Reformers, e.g. pp. 155-9.
likeness there is, the greater is the claim of one thing to be the perfect image of another. 85 The second condition is that the image must be ordained to signify something in particular. The third is that the image must signify singly (using a sign which signifies multiply will mean its likeness to Christ will suffer interference from its likeness to something else). Pecock therefore concludes:
no Cristen man now lyuyng hath these iij. condicions anentis the persoon of Crist in his manhode, as hath a stok or a stoon graued into the likenes of Crist hanging on a cros nakid and wounded…except whanne a quyk man is sett in a pley to be hangid nakid on a cros and to be in semyng woundid and scourgid. And this bifallith ful seelde and in fewe placis and cuntrees. Lines are understood to also be bent or refracted. 90 Repressor, pp. 269-70.
towards the image in the act of bowing and then, finally, replaced with the body itself in the act of touching.
We might think that vision is unique in its reception of species cast out from an object, but, as Pecock notes, all the senses are understood to bring likenesses into the body in essentially similar ways. On the Properties of Things further suggests that all the inner senses, located in the brain, are connected to each of the sense organs, and so in some way to all objects of sense through lines: 'hit is comyn and general to all þe vttir wittis þat fram þe innere wit, þat hatte sensus comunis "þe comyn witte", comeþ as it were lynes out of þe middle þerof to eueruche singular vttir wit and makeþ it parfite'. 91 Thus, in the act of kissing the feet of an image of Christ while imagining kissing the feet of Christ, it is touch itself that establishes the material connection (the lines conveying species) between image and imagination, making them contiguous. The imagined and the actual are thus traversed through touch, creating presence and arousing love.
Touching images
Pecock asserts that the same imaginative and sensory processes at work in the 'practik' of Christians in the past should likewise underpin current devotional and liturgical uses of images.
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In the closing stages of Part 2 of the Repressor, Pecock thus returns the reader to contemporary liturgical performances involving images and touch (those which cause Lollards to feel 'out of eese') with a reformed understanding of their value: the process of making Christ present in the imagination in order to love Him wholeheartedly must be matched in external action and is completed in touch. absence. 93 In the Palm Sunday procession, re-presenting Christ's entry into Jerusalem, the sacrament -the real presence of Christ in the form of bread and wine -is processed outside and then brought into the church. As Eamon Duffy describes:
The clergy and people entered the church, passing under the shrine with the Sacrament, and then the whole procession moved to its culminating point before the Rood-screen.
All through Lent a great painted veil had been suspended in front of the Crucifix on the Rood-screen. This veil was now drawn up on pulleys, the whole parish knelt, and the anthem "Ave Rex Noster" was sung, while the clergy venerated the cross by kissing the ground. 94 On Good Friday, commemorating Christ's Passion, a Crucifix is unveiled (this time, in three stages), culminating in the custom of creeping to it: as Duffy describes, 'Clergy and people then crept barefoot and on their knees to kiss the foot of the cross'. Afterwards, the consecrated Host is symbolically 'buried' in the Easter sepulchre. 95 Deposition rites associated with Holy Week, as
Powell describes, sometimes also used an articulated Christ with moving body parts to re-enact His burial. 96 Scholars have thoroughly documented the ways in which three-dimensional images are thus used, along with the material space and fabric of a church, to emphasise visual spectacle in liturgical performance in the medieval period. 97 More recent scholarship has begun to recognise the ways in which even objects seen in this context also operate in conjunction with haptic experience. Jacqueline E. Jung and Joanne E. Ziegler, for example, find (respectively) that devotional engagements with rood screens and Pietà sculptures should be understood in a tactile frame. 98 But material objects situated in churches, more than just appealing to a sense of touch, also invite literal acts of touching. As Caroline Walker Bynum highlights, devotional objects were often constructed precisely to 'call attention to their materiality by means both obvious and subtle': some were thus designed in such a way as to 'impel…viewers to experience greater tactility as they penetrated to deeper soteriological truth'; others, however, explicitly 'enjoined the worshipper to kiss them'. 99 hand to that of the physical image logically follows. If a reader thus finds friendship a persuasive paradigm for legitimising looking at images of Christ, so too, Pecock argues, will it justify touching images of Him.
Imagine, Pecock urges his reader, Christ were walking on earth in a great crowd of people, and thou myзtist come so nyз that thou schuldist touche with thin hond hise feet or his hond his breste or his cheke or hise clothis, and woldist therbi gendre to thee bi so myche the more affeccioun anentis him than if thou myзtist not so touche him or his clothing, (euen riзt as we han experience that oon persoon gendrith more loue to an other, if he biclippe him in armys, than he schulde, if he not come so nyз to him and not biclippid him,)-it muste nedis folewe, if thou ymagine Crist or an other Seint for to be bodili streiзt thoruзout the bodi of the ymage, that thou schalt gendre, gete, and haue bi so miche the more good affeccioun to God or to the Seint, that thou dost to him touching him in the ymage as bi ymaginacioun.
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Thomas emphasises in the Summa: 'charity grows, not by one charity being added to another, but by being intensified in its subject'. 102 Here, Pecock reminds us yet again that such intensification of charity is most profoundly achieved in touch: a person engenders more love for another if he 'biclippe [embrace] him in armys' than if he merely sees him. In emphasising the connection of touch and love (and so, by extension, of touch and caritas), Pecock suppresses other reasons to touch images, such as healing or to obtain holy properties or virtues. 103 More particularly, Pecock's 'imagine this' instance recalls the Gospel account of the woman suffering a 'flux of blood', who, standing in a crowd, dares to reach out and touch the hem of Christ's clothing in the hope that she might be healed. 104 The healing potential of touching Christ's clothes (via an image of Christ) is here sidestepped. Instead, Pecock stresses again the proximity necessary to the energy of friendship. Acknowledging that Christ's presence would generate a desire to touch Him leads us to accept that the perception of presence (achieved through the process of mapping an interior image onto an exterior one) would likewise make us want to reach out and touch the physical representation. So important and so natural is this point for Pecock that he makes recourse not to one but three further illustrations from the paradigm of friendship, each of which is compelling in its affective charge.
First comes Pecock's boldest analogy: with the desire of those who love each other to be joined as one. Pecock invokes this analogy following on from the example of friendship being maintained at a distance and in absence through intermediaries:
thou woldist be weel plesid, if thi freend, whom thou louest and which loueth thee, wolde sende to the a cosse [kiss] or an handling or a biclipping or eny other bodili touching bi a meene persoon receyuyng thilk cosse, handling, biclipping, or othere touching of him immediatli, and delyueryng to thee as fro him mediatli.
Just as a man derives pleasure from receiving a kiss, an embrace or another bodily touch 'bi a meene person', who first receives it and then delivers it 'mediatli', so too is it 'coueitable', Pecock argues, for a man to obtain through an image a touch (with his face, eyes or mouth) of the feet, mouth, hand or breast of Christ. The use of the material image as a proxy for physical presence is thus explained as natural:
namelich sithen the nature of loue bitwixe persones [is] forto be a moving in to oonyng and ioynyng tho persoones to gidere, in so miche that if tho persoones miзten make euereither of hem forto entre into the ful hool person of the other of hem and forto be 104 The account is given in Matthew 9, Mark 5 and Luke 8.
streiзt thoruз out the bodi or person of the other of hem, than were had a greet entent and purpos into which her loue enclyneth.
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By this point in the imaginative process that makes the external image contiguous with the imagined Christ we have moved far from mapping or stretching and far from optical lines, into a physical overlaying and 'entering into' of bodies: love for another inclines one to desire to touch and to match -more than this, collapse -every part of one's own body into the other's.
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With this powerful example, a reader might ask why Pecock thought two more were necessary. He next sketches a profoundly beautiful instance from the friendship paradigm of parent and child: 'if a man loue a child,' he notes, 'he wole sette his cheke to the cheke of the child, his iзe to the childis iзe, his forhede to the childis forhede, his nose to the childis nose, and therbi the more loue is gendrid anentis the child'. Through this example, I suggest, Pecock seeks both to assert the naturalness of the desire to touch and to cut off the potentially dangerous suggestion of the erotic in his assertion that the love between friends, as modelled in medieval accounts of spiritual friendship, inclines them to union. Such distancing is underscored in Pecock's final example that comes from the paradigm of the lord and servant: is it not also the case, he asks, that a man who is loved particularly by a lord 'mai be admyttid for to come so nyз that he lie with the lord in oon bed? And if he mai not be admyttid into so greet nyзnes, зit if he mai be admittid for to ligge in the same chambir with the lord, certis therbi schal good loue and affeccioun be gendrid'. With this last excessive example, Pecock thus seems to hope (though we might judge that he fails) to rein in the excess of affect that his insistence on the validity of touching an image of Christ has provoked. If the desire for presence experienced through touch is universal to love in all its forms, as is implied by Pecock's examples taken from the friendship 105 Repressor, pp. 271-2. On the role in Thomas's account of the apprehension of species in effecting a union between those who love each other, Summa theologiae, 1a2ae.28. 106 Here Pecock seems to be drawing on the notion of the friend as another self, developed in monastic traditions of spiritual friendship, rather than sexual union, though this too is a possible interpretation. On the friend as a another self in monastic traditions, see Krahmer, 'The Friend as a "Second Self"'.
of lord and servant, of father and child and between equals, then meeting the difficult demands of caritas might also legitimately require it.
Pecock's sustained engagement with the figure of the absent friend in his defence of the use of images in the Repressor thus very clearly shows that what is at stake (for him) is the problem Christ's absence causes for sensory perception and for imagination. In pursuing the logic of friendship with Christ, Pecock shows the debate about images not only to be about vision, or about ways of seeing, but also about touch, and about the imaginative practices that should engage these sensory processes. In his insistent return to the imaginative process in which
Christ is 'streiзt thoruзout the bodi of the ymage', Pecock establishes not only a sense of touch but an actual experience of touch as the grounds for approximating presence. Since Christ is absent, imagining touching Him is the next best thing to His real presence, but imagination (under the feeble conditions of the human mind) needs physical images. If, when viewing and simultaneously touching an image, a man maps the imagined image onto the physical one, the sense of touch gives real solidity to imagining -making vividly present Christ the friend.
